Commentary by the ICC
Presidency
The "Tobin tax"
- a business viewpoint
Corporate Economists Advisory Group, 14
December
2001
French
version
Introduction
Since originally raised in 1974 by Professor James Tobin, Nobel Memorial Prize
winner in economics, the question of taxing international transactions in different
currencies has over the years been proposed in various versions and for a number
of different reasons. While ICC considers that greater stability of financial
markets is desirable, it also believes that a "Tobin tax" would be
harmful to international trade, economic growth and welfare, and businesses
throughout the world. The smallest nations would be most hurt. The tax would
not prove feasible in practice since it would require uniform implementation
throughout the world, and would need to encompass not only spot transactions
but also substitutes and supplements such as currency swaps, forwards and futures
in order to limit evasion.
Tobin's
original idea
Tobin's original idea was to introduce an internationally uniform tax on all
spot conversions of one currency into another, proportional to the size of the
transaction. The impact of such a tax would obviously punish short-term trading
more seriously than longer-term trading. A major concern was to make currency
exchange rates reflect to a larger degree long-run fundamentals relative to
short-range expectations and risks, and thus reduce volatility. A second objective
was to preserve and promote the autonomy of national macroeconomic and monetary
policies. To raise revenues for international purposes was never a main motivation
of Professor Tobin, but is a major purpose of many of the present supporters
of such a tax.
Transactions
are necessary to cover currency risks
An estimated 1,500 billion US dollars are traded each day on the world's foreign
exchange markets. Most transactions are for less than one week - most within
a day - and the interbank share is approximately 70-80 per cent of the total.
To a large extent, the high volume of the transactions reflects genuine needs
to cover currency risks and spread the risks among different participants in
the exchange market, in much the same ways that insurance risks are distributed
on the international reinsurance market. Certainly, a single trade transaction
may easily result in ten currency transactions because the currency risk is
passed around among currency dealers like a hot potato. In most countries there
are strict regulations regarding how much uncovered currency exposure banks
may accept.
Harmful
effects
A consequence of a Tobin tax would be to reduce short-term trading. But there
would be no guarantee that exchange rate volatility would diminish because liquidity
would also diminish. Indeed, minor currencies might become more volatile and
vulnerable to manipulative speculative attacks. Reduced liquidity would also
make stabilizing long-term arbitrage more risky. Thus, customers' transaction
costs would increase more than the tax levied. As with stock and security markets,
some degree of short term trading - or speculation - is desirable on most currency
markets to increase liquidity.
Transactions between minor
currencies would be particularly hurt because there are no cross rates between
many of them. Hence, it is necessary to
use a major currency - for instance
the US dollar (which is part of 80 to 90 per cent of all currency transactions)
- as an intermediary currency. This implies two transactions or more (if an
additional intermediary currency is required). Consequently, the tax might be
doubled or tripled for conversions between many minor currencies. Because of
the costs involved, pension funds and other portfolio managers would increase
their home bias. Less capital would be available for international capital markets
in general, and for investments in minor currencies in particular.
At a reasonable rate, say
0.05 per cent, the increased domestic autonomy the tax would provide in setting
interest rates would be negligible. And to the extent it did work, there might
be a loss of discipline on economic policy stemming from abroad.
A Tobin tax would not prevent
speculative attacks on a currency where the expected gain might be high -- not
unusually 10 per cent or more over a week. Furthermore, a tax could neither
rectify nor repair unsustainable economic policy, which more often than not
is the main reason why a currency comes under attack.
An impracticable
tax
A Tobin tax would prove impracticable since it would require worldwide coverage,
or at least coverage encompassing the G 10 countries, supplemented by a penalty
on transactions to tax havens. Unilateral implementation would move currency
trading offshore. Not only spot transactions, but also derivatives like currency
swaps, forwards and futures would need to be taxed, since they are substitutes
for and supplements to spot transactions.
ICC notes that Professor
Tobin today is no longer a proponent of the tax that bears his name -- inter
alia, because the currency regime is now very different from the time when he
originally proposed the tax and because he supports free trade as an instrument
for raising welfare throughout the world.
Conclusion
In conclusion, ICC is firmly of the view that it would not be feasible to implement
a Tobin tax. And even if it were feasible, such a tax would neither significantly
prevent speculative attacks on currencies nor increase national economic autonomy.
The tax would throw sand in the wheels of international trade and investment
and would harm the prospects for raising global economic growth and the welfare
of all peoples.
About
ICC
ICC is the world business organization, the only representative body that speaks
with authority on behalf of enterprises from all sectors in every part of the
world. ICC promotes an open international trade and investment system and the
market economy. Business leaders and experts drawn from the ICC membership establish
the business stance on broad issues of trade and investment policy as well as
on vital technical and sectoral subjects. ICC was founded in 1919 and today
it groups thousands of member companies and associations from over 130 countries.
Document 105 / 41 final
14 December 2001